# Topic K 1nc

#### The affirmative fundamentally ignores the current socio-political occasion, one governed by a military metaphysics of violence. We are in the midst of a neoliberal revolution, an in-between time of governance, converging with violence, to place all life under the universalizing sign of the permanent war zone.

#### The 1AC constitutes an act of willfully forgetting, not only of the very situation in which it emerges, but also the task of the intellectual in this age; one who bears the responsibility of rendering opaque forms of violence visible rather than merely (re)organize the ongoing production of violence.

#### This debate is a question of competing trajectories of intellectual inquiry – the question you should ask yourself is the benefit of endorsing a mode of scholarship that focuses exclusively on the technocratic administration of war.

Giroux 2013 (Henry A. Giroux, Professor at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University. The Violence of Organized Forgetting, Truthout | Op-Ed. Monday, 22 July 2013 00:00, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/17647-the-violence-of-organized-forgetting)

I want to argue that the current historical moment or what Stuart Hall calls the "long march of the Neoliberal Revolution,"[27] has to be understood in terms of the growing forms of violence that it deploys and reinforces. Such antidemocratic pressures and their relationship to the rising protests of young people in the United States and abroad are evident in the crisis that has emerged through the merging of governance and violence, the growth of the punishing state, and the persistent development of what has been described by Alex Honneth as "a failed sociality."[28] ¶ The United States has become addicted to violence, and this dependency is fueled increasingly by its willingness to wage war at home and abroad. War in this instance is not merely the outgrowth of polices designed to protect the security and well-being of the United States. It is also, as C. Wright Mills pointed out, part of a "military metaphysics" - a complex of forces that includes corporations, defense industries, politicians, financial institutions and universities.[29] War provides jobs, profits, political payoffs, research funds, and forms of political and economic power that reach into every aspect of society. War is also one of the nation's most honored virtues, and its militaristic values now bear down on almost every aspect of American life.[30] As modern society is formed against the backdrop of a permanent war zone, a carceral state and hyper-militarism, the social stature of the military and soldiers has risen. As Michael Hardt and Tony Negri have pointed out, "In the United States, rising esteem for the military in uniform corresponds to the growing militarization of the society as a whole. All of this despite repeated revelations of the illegality and immorality of the military's own incarceration systems, from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib, whose systematic practices border on if not actually constitute torture."[31] The state of exception in the United States, in particular, has become permanent and promises no end. War has become a mode of sovereignty and rule, eroding the distinction between war and peace. Increasingly fed by a moral and political hysteria, warlike values produce and endorse shared fears as the primary register of social relations. ¶The war on terror, rebranded under Obama as the "Overseas Contingency Operation," has morphed into war on democracy. Everyone is now considered a potential terrorist, providing a rational for both the government and private corporations to spy on anybody, regardless of whether they have committed a crime. Surveillance is supplemented by a growing domestic army of baton-wielding police forces who are now being supplied with the latest military equipment. Military technologies such as Drones, SWAT vehicles and machine-gun-equipped armored trucks once used exclusively in high-intensity war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan are now being supplied to police departments across the nation and not surprisingly "the increase in such weapons is matched by training local police in war zone tactics and strategies."[32] The domestic war against "terrorists" [code for young protesters] provides new opportunities for major defense contractors and corporations who "are becoming more a part of our domestic lives."[33] As Glenn Greenwald points out, "Arming domestic police forces with paramilitary weaponry will ensure their systematic use even in the absence of a terrorist attack on US soil; they will simply find other, increasingly permissive uses for those weapons."[34] Of course, the new domestic paramilitary forces will also undermine free speech and dissent with the threat of force while simultaneously threatening core civil liberties, rights and civic responsibilities. Given that "by age 23, almost a third of Americans are arrested for a crime," it becomes clear that in the new militarized state young people, especially poor minorities, are viewed as predators, a threat to corporate governance, and are treated as disposable populations.[35] This siege mentality will be reinforced by the merging of private and corporate intelligence and surveillance agencies, and the violence it produces will increase as will the growth of a punishment state that acts with impunity. Too much of this violence is reminiscent of the violence used against civil rights demonstrators by the forces of Jim Crow in the 1950s and 1960s.[36]¶ Yet, there is more at work here than the prevalence of armed knowledge and a militarized discourse, there is also the emergence of a militarized society that now organizes itself "for the production of violence."[37] A society in which "the range of acceptable opinion inevitably shrinks."[38] But the prevailing move in American society to a permanent war status does more than promote a set of unifying symbols that embrace a survival of the fittest ethic, promoting conformity over dissent, the strong over the weak, and fear over responsibility, it also gives rise to what David Graeber has called a "language of command" in which violence becomes the most important element of power and mediating force in shaping social relationships.[39]¶ Permanent War and the Public Pedagogy of Hyper-Violence¶ As a mode of public pedagogy, a state of permanent war needs willing subjects to abide by its values, ideology, and narratives of fear and violence. Such legitimation is largely provided through a market-driven culture addicted to the production of consumerism, militarism and organized violence, largely circulated through various registers of popular culture that extend from high fashion and Hollywood movies to the creation of violent video games and music concerts sponsored by the Pentagon. The market-driven spectacle of war demands a culture of conformity, quiet intellectuals and a largely passive republic of consumers. There is also a need for subjects who find intense pleasure in commodification of violence and a culture of cruelty. Under neoliberalism, culture appears to have largely abandoned its role as a site of critique. Very little appears to escape the infantilizing and moral vacuity of the market. For instance, the architecture of war and violence is now matched by a barrage of goods parading as fashion. For instance, in light of the recent NSA and PRISM spying revelations in the United States, The New York Times ran a story on a new line of fashion with the byline: "Stealth Wear Aims to Make a Tech Statement."[40] As the pleasure principle is unconstrained by a moral compass based on a respect for others, it is increasingly shaped by the need for intense excitement and a never-ending flood of heightened sensations. Marked by a virulent notion of hardness and aggressive masculinity, a culture of violence has become commonplace in a society in which pain, humiliation and abuse are condensed into digestible spectacles endlessly circulated through extreme sports, reality TV, video games, YouTube postings, and proliferating forms of the new and old media. But the ideology of hardness, and the economy of pleasure it justifies are also present in the material relations of power that have intensified since the Reagan presidency, when a shift in government policies first took place and set the stage for the emergence of unchecked torture and state violence under the Bush-Cheney regime. Conservative and liberal politicians alike now spend millions waging wars around the globe, funding the largest military state in the world, providing huge tax benefits to the ultra-rich and major corporations, and all the while draining public coffers, increasing the scale of human poverty and misery, and eliminating all viable public spheres - whether they be the social state, public schools, public transportation or any other aspect of a formative culture that addresses the needs of the common good.¶ State violence, particularly the use of torture, abductions, and targeted assassinations are now justified as part of a state of exception in which a "political culture of hyper-punitiveness"[41] has become normalized. Revealing itself in a blatant display of unbridled arrogance and power, it is unchecked by any sense of either conscience or morality. How else to explain the right-wing billionaire, Charles Koch, insisting that the best way to help the poor is to get rid of the minimum wage. In response, journalist Rod Bastanmehr points out that "Koch didn't acknowledge the growing gap between the haves and the have-nots, but he did make sure to show off his fun new roll of $100-bill toilet paper, which was a real treat for folks everywhere."[42] It gets worse. Ray Canterbury, a Republican member of the West Virginia House of Delegates insisted that "students could be forced into labor in exchange for food."[43] In other words, students could clean toilets, do janitorial work or other menial chores in order to pay for their free school breakfast and lunch programs. In Maine, Rep. Bruce Bickford (R) has argued that the state should do away with child labor laws. His rationale speaks for itself. He writes: ""Kids have parents. Let the parents be responsible for the kids. It's not up to the government to regulate everybody's life and lifestyle. Take the government away. Let the parents take care of their kids."[44] This is a version of social Darwinism on steroids, a tribute to Ayn Rand that would make even her blush.¶ Public values are not only under attack in the United States and elsewhere but appear to have become irrelevant just as those spaces that enable an experience of the common good are now the object of disdain by right-wing and liberal politicians, anti-public intellectuals and an army of media pundits. State violence operating under the guise of personal safety and security, while parading as a bulwark of democracy, actually does the opposite and cancels out democracy "as the incommensurable sharing of existence that makes the political possible."[45] Symptoms of ethical, political and economic impoverishment are all around us.¶ Continued…¶ Widespread violence now functions as part of an anti-immune system that turns the economy of genuine pleasure into a mode of sadism that creates the foundation for sapping democracy of any political substance and moral vitality. The predominance of the disimagination machine in American society, along with its machinery of social death and historical amnesia, seeps into in all aspects of life, suggesting that young people and others marginalized by class, race and ethnicity have been abandoned. But historical and public memory is not merely on the side of domination.

#### Professor Jason Adams of Evergreen State College explains how…

*…technology, … is always developed for someone and for some purpose, namely that of the military, the media, the state and other centers of power. …technocracy as the totalitarian replacement of participatory politics … has come about because the instrumentalism that was born with what we call 'technology' has exceeded the machinic bounds of the term … with the result that today it necessarily includes any standardized complex of procedures that transform nature, animals or humans into a means to an end, such that reflective and deliberatory decision-making are replaced, as seen for example in the way in which both the machinic technology of the nuclear bomb and the economic technology of neoliberalism involve the transformation of billions of living beings into either hostages or consumers rather than political actors in their own right. Thus, politics and technology can no longer be separated in a time when the latter forms the very framework within which the former takes place, to such an extent in fact, that deliberation is often subsumed by technique altogether; … this occurs because "technology encompasses not just nuclear power stations and computers. It extends… hedgerows, trees and walls. The row of trees outside the American Embassy in London was not planted out of commitment to natural beauty, but to break up student demonstrations, just as the Paris streets were designed to frustrate revolutionary mobs".'° …almost all of the most important decisions in regard to overall design are made not by the people directly affected by them, much less by their elected representatives in government, but rather by technicians who not only exclude the public from the decision of whether or not a particular form of technology should be introduced, but even design them from the start so as to preclude the very possibility from ever occurring at all."[[1]](#footnote-1)*

#### It’s always the well-meaning liberals…

#### Despite the affirmative’s manufactured appeal of dissent and criticism in the face of an ever-expanding drone war machine, it’s procedural primacy and investigatory origins give up the ghost in order to conceal of the specter.

#### The 1AC buys into a larger networked revolution of neoliberal power reconfiguration and presents us with a test site of humanity. Not in *what* the 1AC reveals about the reversibility of terrorism… or, operational inefficiency… or hell, even practical illegality of the strikes themselves… but rather in the emergence of blind spots that naturally follow it’s an all-accommodating discursive swoop of co-mission and commiseration with those we believe to have removed themselves from the human community.

#### *This* receipt of failure shall serve as documentation of an event in which the interlocking mechanics of exploitation and oppression gain permanency.

Hayes 2013 (Heather Ashley Hayes, Asst Prof of Rhetoric, Whitman College. “Violent Subjects: A Rhetorical Cartography of Bodies, Spaces, and Technologies in the Global War on Terror.” A Dissertation SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Heather Ashley Hayes IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Ronald Walter Greene, Adviser, April 2013)

Another line of argument over drone production and use centers around whether or not U.S. drone strikes are counterproductive in terms of diminishing adherence to and recruitment for militant groups in the Pakistani and Afghani regions. As Owen Bowcott, a legal affairs correspondent with The Guardian explains, “the CIA’s programme of ‘targeted’ drone killings in Pakistan’s tribal heartlands is counterproductive, kills large numbers of civilians, and undermines respect for international law.”139 He goes on to note that the research he cites is particularly powerful, namely because “coming from American lawyers rather than overseas human rights groups, the criticisms are likely to be more influential in U.S. domestic debates over the legality of drone warfare.” Additionally, Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and Matt Flannes, all affiliated with the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Arizona note that drone use can be critiqued in another realm: military efficiency. As they note, “the erosion of trust and lack of clarity in U.S. drone policy produces strategic and tactical confusion within U.S. defense and intelligence agencies. This confusion proves unhelpful as exit strategies for the Afghan war are debated and continuing evaluation of U.S.- Pakistani relations are assessed behind closed doors.”140¶ Yet another interesting approach to drone critique comes from Daniel Klaidman, former Newsweek journalist and author, who, in June of 2012, gave an account of how President Barack Obama was first informed of a newly emerging (and now common) practice of “signature striking.” Signature strikes target groups of suspected militants, without determining identity. These stem from different procedural norms than targeted strikes, which identify individuals with ties to militant organizations and aim for a surgical missile launch against the individual rather than the group. Klaidman recounts the moment that the president was informed about the nature of signature strikes:¶ Sometimes called “crowd killing,” signature strikes are deeply unpopular in Pakistan. Obama struggled to understand the concept. Steve Kappes, the CIA’s deputy director, offered a blunt explanation. “Mr. President, we can see that there are a lot of military-age males down there, men associated with terrorist activity, but we don’t always know who they are.” Obama reacted sharply. “That’s not good enough for me,” he said. But he was still listening. Hayden forcefully defended the signature approach. You could take out a lot more bad guys when you targeted groups instead of individuals, he said. And there was another benefit: the more afraid militants were to congregate, the harder it would be for them to plot, plan, or train for attacks against America and its interests...Obama remained unsettled. “The president’s view was ‘OK, but what assurances do I have that there aren’t women and children there?” according to a source familiar with his thinking. “How do I know that this is working? Who makes these decisions? Where do they make them, and where’s my opportunity to intervene?”141¶ As per Klaidman’s depiction, further developed in his recent book-length treatment of the subject,142 President Obama remained the voice of concern and dissent in many of the discussions about unmanned aerial vehicles and their deployment, particularly over the killing of women and children and over the legal and procedural mandates necessary for the program to “be legal”. This is a sharply contrasted position to Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, now CIA Director, John Brennan, quoted as replying to Obama’s misgivings about the program: “We’re killing these sons of bitches faster than they can grow them.”143 Additionally, this new discourse supplements the growing idea of legal drone processes by making a distinction among various genres of strikes. Overall, dissent and critique around the program has come from many sites, ranging from Obama’s own concerns about legality and particular “innocent bodies” (i.e. women and children) to academic qualms with international law and United States military efficiency. Yet few, if any, voices indict the program beyond its legality and its judicial and processual implications. Even in Obama’s concern over signature strike action, innocent life is reconfigured as young in the body of a child and feminine in the body of a woman. His own authority as president in making decisions is a primary rationale for interrogating strike deployment. A discourse of reasonability is normalized, even in dissent. Journalists, politicians, and academics harp on the drone program’s effectiveness in targeting the terrorists it is supposed to target and its legality in adhering to an always already established system of transnational legal norms. When leading American news outlets publish forums on the topic (e.g. The New York Times forum of September 2012, cited above) these mechanisms for objection are further embedded in the circulation of knowledges and practices with regard to drones. The January 2013 announcement of John Brennan’s transition from counterterrorism advisor into a more legally articulated role of CIA Director points to the very practices of this normalization.¶ Yet, while forms of dissent against drones become normalized in particular discourses and practices, others evaporate from view. Circulatory exploration, with a look to the rhetoricoviolence of the space of drone warfare, allows several longtime drone activists to emerge, who are/have been organizing in the regions most affected by unmanned aerial vehicle attack. Among these activists is Pakistani politician and former cricketer Imran Khan.¶ Pakistani drone activist and leader of the Tehreek-e-Insaf party (Pakistan Movement for Justice), Imran Khan, leading a drone protest in Pashtun Tribal Lands of Pakistan, Khan has remained mostly ignored by Western media, politicians, and academics discussing the implication of drone attacks, despite being an ardent opponent of drone use since 1998, before the American election of George W. Bush and before the September 11, 2001 attacks by al-Qaeda against U.S. targets. His only mentions in U.S. and British media came after Khan led a protest against drone use in the tribal region of Pakistan in October of 2012. While Khan had led more than a hundred similar protests in the same region since 2002, this one was halted by the Pakistani government, due to the fact that Khan allowed leaders from the United States anti-war organization Code Pink to be a part of the protest, namely vocal anti-drone activist Medea Benjamin. Expressing fear that a￼￼￼ large rally featuring American protesters could safely be held in the South Waziristan region, the Pakistani government blocked access to the protest, and shut it down. Benjamin, Code Pink’s founder, hailed the trip as a success directly as a result of American involvement rather than Khan’s organizing efforts, noting the value as: “to show the face of the American people that believe that the lives of Pakistanis are as valuable as the lives of any American.”145¶ Khan becomes an even more fascinating case study in the normalizing power of everyday practice and discourse over drones when looking to his few remarks in English on the drone program. In two interviews with American media (one on a CNN video logged program and one on a CNN program airing at 8am EST), Khan offered powerful critiques of the unmanned aerial vehicle program that differ from the normalized discourses I have discussed. In an interview with Jim Clancey on CNN’s News Stream (now cancelled due to low ratings), Khan remarked, “According to many international reports, only 2% of high level targets are killed. So who are these 98%?...I just do not understand how anyone can sit in front of a computer screen, press some buttons, and kill people...this is inhuman.”146 Khan went on to expand his position on drones in an interview with Elliot Spitzer on CNN’s In the Arena (also cancelled in late 2011 due to¶ low ratings): “Look, I’m sitting in Pakistan. I’m telling you the impact drone attacks are having in this country. And I’m telling you that the more drone attacks the more anti- Americanism, the more anti-Americanism the more radicalization. The more radicalization, there is only one beneficiary, and that’s al-Qaeda.”147¶ While Khan adheres to the discourse of effectiveness in his comments about drone attack’s ability to boost membership in militant Islamic organizations found in some Western sources, he also cites his positional authority as a member of the Pakistani population as a primary vantage point. And, the differences in his tone between 2011 and 2012 are notable, where he grows much more hostile to drones from a human, rather than legal, perspective, venturing to call their very use inhuman. Additionally, Khan’s political efforts in Pakistan have been in the name of an Islamist republic. Throughout the 2000s, while protesting the increasing use and development of U.S. drone technology, Khan also sided with Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of theocratic parties in Pakistan, on a number of controversial anti-American positions. These included strong opposition of U.S. military presence in Pakistan and the abolition of corporate use of any Pakistani lands so that there could be a redistribution of that wealth back to peasant populations of the tribal regions. For all practical purposes, his prominent disagreement with al-Qaeda appears to be over their mass scale violence, not over violence more generally. In fact, in May of 2005, when Khan learned of a case of Qur’an desecration at the United States’ Guantánamo Bay’s detention facility, he made a sweeping appeal to Islamic journalists that Islam was “under attack” by the United States, a claim which has been credited with the deaths of over 16 people in anti-American riots in the neighboring Afghanistan. Khan defends the violence, arguing “To throw the Qur'an in the toilet is the greatest violation of a Muslim's human rights...When you speak out, people react. Violence is regrettable, but that's not the point.”148 In this sense, it is clear that the violence of the drone attacks are not what Khan necessarily opposes but rather the particular type of constituted violence against human beings. In this case, the violence is perpetrated against Pakistani citizens. With both Western critique of drone attacks and Khan’s position in mind, what does this normalization of some and exclusion of other forms of protest and dissent mean for understanding the circulation of drone warfare and its relationship to rhetoricoviolence? Judith Butler has offered one frame for consideration here, in her fundamental question about what human life is grievable. As she argues, “lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which human vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as ‘grievable’.”149 To return to Jackson’s opening arguments about remaking the world in particular ways, Butler’s claims are realized in the circulation and culture of drone warfare through the United States. Khan finds the lives lost in drone strikes highly grievable, and a compelling piece of the map that should operate to end their use in his view. Most Western critics of the program find the same lives lost grievable only insofar as they represent violations of international law and/or the standards of military operational efficiency.¶ I argue that more than being a materialist rhetoric, the U.S. drone program has generated a new set of everyday practices, institutions, and subjects that flow through a larger network of power within the global war on terror. This flow has endless directions and functions to not only open up available spigots but also to close some of them off. In other words, the program allows for subject positions to appear on a map in one place, while simultaneously possessing the power to move those subject positions into other available spaces. In this case, the two available subject positions could be understood as grievable or not grievable. The drone program demonstrates the falsity and impotence an oppositional binary between rhetoric and violence offers in helping explicate increasingly complex problems of the global war on terror, particularly in transnational contexts. As a materialist rhetoric, rhetoricoviolence lends itself to working outside of the bounds of this binary, particularly in its assumptions that rhetoric and violence are most potent when they travel together, indistinguishable from one another.¶ So if Butler’s precarity of life is well reflected in the revelations and concealments within the circulation of the drone program, how does that precarity get extended to the technological politics of governance in which the U.S. drone program is steeped? As she notes, “when we think that others have taken themselves out of the human community as we know it, is a test of our very humanity.” This test of humanity strikes at the heart of many discursive moves about drones’ legality and processual articulation, and echoes another argument by Martin Luther King, Jr. In discussing the Vietnam War, King predicted, “When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, militarism and economic exploitation are incapable of being conquered.” While the concealing capability found in the rhetoricoviolence of drones begins to articulate one possible realization of King’s claims in practice, next I look to the ways technological warfare (in this case, the drone program) uses these revelations and concealments to reconfigure modes of governance.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### A primary example of this occurs in the design of the 1AC. In both it’s form and content one discovers a fundamental complicity with the jeremiadic narrative of American exceptionalism. The epistemological architecture of the 1AC itself, the entire consort of media sources selected dancing together contrapunctually before our very eyes… almost if to confess it’s ruse…

#### The seemingly ‘objective’ and neutral forms knowledge the produced by the affirmative remain complicit with the neoliberal linage of expansion and violence from which they arise…

#### Hold the affirmatives evidence suspect

McVicker 2012 (THE TASK OF JOURNALISM IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM IMAGINING THE PROFANE McVicker, Jeanette Philosophy Today; May 2012; 56, 2; ProQuest pg. 243)

There's not much surprise in suggesting that "news" has become a commodity in today's American and global capitalist culture. Critic after critic has diagnosed some aspect of the crisis facing news, or journalism, or media (or various combinations of these). One could address the impact of that commodification along a number of lines of inquiry and recognize the myriad implications for journalism today: for example, by focusing on the consequences of corporate media consolidation; the narrowing of political viewpoints resulting a new type of propaganda; the "indexing" of perspective that amounts to a bias toward whomever is in power based on whether there is "official opposition"; the absence of critical interpretive contexts accompanying the stubborn commitment to fact-based "objective" reporting- the list could go on rather extensively. 17 While all of these focuses provide timely, in-depth analysis of important problems besetting contemporary American journalism, this essay seeks instead to elucidate the ways in which the U.S. tradition of journalism has not only accommodated but is deeply complicitous in promoting the myth of American exceptionalism. ¶ Such a perspective foregrounds the ontological dimension of how journalists, the organizations for which they work, the public in whose ostensible "interest" they labor and the sources and institutions they utilize and report on, all function under the myth's guise.¶ What these important critiques omit from their horizons of analysis is precisely the ontological, which renders their otherwise astute and compelling insights finally incapable of addressing journalism's foundational blindness. For example, The New York Daily Times for October 21, 1851 deals with "Indian Affairs, mining intelligence, and the arrival of a steamship from Jamaica." 18 The mining story reveals multiple layers that demonstrate my ontological point: here's one paragraph:¶ "Mining Intelligence":¶ Every American naturally desires to work on his own hook, to exemplify his independence, and when the chances are equal, ninety out of every hundred will prefer it. Thus capitalists are forced to pay heavier prices for hands, and in some cases can hardly get them for any sum. Mexicans and Chilians do the burthen of the work in the southern placers [sic], and it is likely that they will continue to do it. Raised as serfs they know no organization or restraint, save such as springs directly from the hands of the taskmaster. Lazy and vicious, they work only when forced to do it. and then, to secure a Jiving, naturally become dependent upon the enterprise of others. Thus the southern mines are peopled with a set of men equally as much slaves as the negroes on the plantations of Texas or Louisiana. ¶ In the same Page 1 round-up, a report on "Indian affairs" reveals even more strongly the exceptionalist narrative at its heart. (For temporal context, the Sand Creek Massacre would take place in November, 1864):¶ We learn from The Alta California that the Indians in all the northern country are represented as troublesome and dangerous. It has become impossible to travel through the country, except in large parties and well-armed, as the savages invariably murder every isolated individual. The state of things has a most disastrous effect upon the interests of that section of the State. It has broken up many of the smaller interior settlements, has stopped the working of many of the most productive mining tracts, and has almost completely annihilated the business of the merchants and packers who have been engaged in supplying the miners from the coast towns. A general uncertainty, and stagnation of trade and business, is fast following this unfortunate position of affairs; and unless the Indian Commissioner or the State Government soon adopt some measures for the eradication of this evil, the northern country will be most lamentably and disastrously retarded, if not utterly ruined.¶ With the exception of a few tribes on the head waters of the Sacramento, all the Indians south of Pitt river have agreed to terms proposed to them by Dr Wozencraft, one of the Indian Commissioners.¶ That gentleman, says The Alta, has every confidence that they will adhere to the situations, and if not molested give no further trouble to the whites. Dr W thinks that before the expiration of the year there will be as many as 80,000 Indians upon the reservations already made, a large number having already commenced their occupation.¶ These two glimpses into the way journalists reported such significant events reveal the polyvalent historical adaptability of the exceptionalist narrative: from its roots in Puritan religio-political ideology it accommodated an Enlightenment juridical humanism without dislodging the idea of the sacred at its animating principle. As the previous section was at pains to point out, that humanism carried within it a will to violence even in the name of the sacred. The rise of capitalism together with increasing reliance on technology and science to achieve its aims, particularly over the course of the nineteenth century, provide the parameters for the narrative's dominant articulation in that era as manifest destiny: both the land, and the indigenous people on the land, must yield to the advancement of the "truly" human white, capitalist Americans. A century later-with a civil war, world wars, and nuclear war recorded primarily as "achievements" in the history of America's progress-the narrative reasserts itself within the growing national security state Jocked in twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, announcing the expansion of its destiny as beacon to the "free world." The so-called "end of history" initiated by the collapse of the Soviet Union notwithstanding, the narrative of American exception continues altered yet unabated in the aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks in September 2001. By continually wedding itself to a providential narrative of progress with the "idea" of America as its motivating force, the institution of journalism and the myth of American exceptionalism have been mutually self-sustaining-to journalism's detriment.

#### The plan is anything but a simple corrective. By placing blame on the unique circumstances of exceptionalism - the specific failed projects and policy blemishes we can all now admit as mistakes or accidents along an otherwise pure trajectory of empire – obscures the fact the pre-emptive logic of security is what allowed said harms to arise in the first place. The temporal exceptionalism of pre-emptive security results in serial policy failure, turning case

Stockdale 2013 (Liam P.D. Stockdale, Department of Political Science, McMaster University (2013) Imagined futures and exceptional presents: a conceptual critique of ‘pre-emptive security’, Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, 25:2, 141-157, DOI: 10.1080/14781158.2013.774342)

These potentially problematic aspects of pre-emptive security are exacerbated by the fact that its underlying precautionary imperative to actively confront radical uncertainty leads its praxis to favour the path of action over that of restraint. As former Vice President Dick Cheney asserted with respect to the potential threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, ‘the risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action’.83 This proactive dimension ensures that adopting a pre-emptive strategy entails both a high level of activity and a concomitantly increased likelihood that errors will be made. Indeed, as David Runciman asserts, anticipatory political strategies akin to pre-emptive security prioritize action over inaction and thus ‘do not take seriously enough the downside of getting things wrong’.84 The result is that such incidents as the Menezes shooting can be easily framed as mere ‘accidents’ or ‘mistakes’ that, while regrettable, are an inevitable aspect of pre-emptive security.85 The blame can thus be placed on the unique circumstances of each case, obscuring the fact that – in a manner reminiscent of Virilio’s notion of the ‘integral accident’86 or Derrida’s idea of ‘autoimmunity’87 – it can actually be traced to the logic of pre-emption itself, since this is what ultimately makes such incidents possible.¶ In this sense, pre-emptive security’s inexorable focus on the future offers a built-in justiﬁcation for any violent excesses that may take place in the present. When so framed, it offers a helpful segue into the discussion of the inherent conceptual incoherence of pre-emptive security, and so provides a useful way to conclude this section. To elaborate upon this point, we must return to the question of temporality and recognize that the logic of pre-emption presupposes a very particular political relationship between present and future, in which the governance of the latter is prioritized while the former is construed in instrumental terms as the location of the anticipatory interventions required to make this priority actionable. This political temporality has a normative corollary, in that, taken to its logical conclusion, it implies that any action in the present can be cast as a legitimate means for achieving the overarching end of pre-empting a future catastrophe. In other words, it suggests that such ‘exceptional’ acts as the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes or the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki can be legitimated for no other reason than that they take place in the present. Returning to the idea of exceptionalism more speciﬁcally, the logic of pre-emptive security thus inscribes the present as an ‘exceptional temporal space’ where all anticipatory action – regardless of its extrajudiciality or arbitrary violence – is originarily legitimated. To put it another way, pre-emptive security is characterized by the enaction of a temporalized state of exception, in which the present is effectively ‘taken hostage’ for the purpose of ensuring that the future unfolds in a particular way. Indeed, the exceptionalism of pre-emptive security is applied in speciﬁc relation to the dimension of time, with the present constituting the ‘exceptional space’ where juridically unbound state action takes place.¶ It is the emergence of such a temporal exceptionalism that is at stake with the proliferation ofpre-emptive security rationalities in response to the threat of transnational terrorism. When considered alongside the illiberal paradigm of political authority that it also presupposes, this seriously calls into question the coherence of pre-emption as a security rationality, since any experience of security must take place in a lived present that is always already constructed as an inherently insecure ‘state of exception’. This tension is particularly acute with respect to the self-identiﬁed liberal democratic states that are paradoxically at the vanguard of this pre-emptive turn,88 since the very principles that pre-emptive security strategies are mobilized to protect in the future are thus necessarily compromised in the present by the prosecution of a pre-emptive security strategy.89 These points suggest a more fundamental conceptual tension at the core of pre-emptive security that goes even beyond its problematic political implications and renders the very idea of pre-emptive security all but incoherent. The ﬁnal section explores this point in more detail.

#### Our alternative is to renounce the affirmative…

#### The alternative *‘requires continual and vigilant mapping of the remainder of the Obama administration’s term and beyond with regard to unmanned aerial warfare’.*

#### Debate doesn’t leave the room – or rather, the value of the affirmatives inquiry doesn’t exist outside of the debate space. The rhetorical form, situation, and primacy of the 1AC itself constructs a contingent space of debate that can only be activated in service of streamlining our justifications for drone strikes and the perpetual (re)generation of technological warfare.

Hayes 2013 (Heather Ashley Hayes, Asst Prof of Rhetoric, Whitman College. “Violent Subjects: A Rhetorical Cartography of Bodies, Spaces, and Technologies in the Global War on Terror.” A Dissertation SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Heather Ashley Hayes IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Ronald Walter Greene, Adviser, April 2013)

As Karen DeYoung describes, “The ‘playbook,’ as Brennan calls it, will lay out the administration’s evolving procedures for the targeted killings that have come to define its fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. It will cover the selection and approval of targets from the ‘disposition matrix,’ the designation of who should pull the trigger when a killing is warranted, and the legal authorities the administration thinks sanction its actions in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond.”164 DeYoung goes on to note that decisions regarding strikes, while informed by the matrix, have predominantly been made by Brennan and Obama alone, at times while the president is eating dinner with his family. Miller summarizes the process of integrating the disposition matrix into these decisions succinctly: “White House counterterrorism adviser John O Brennan is seeking to codify the administration's approach to generating capture/kill lists, part of a broader effort to guide future administrations through the counterterrorism processes that Obama has embraced.”165

Legal scholars have repeatedly described the matrix itself as a helpful managerial tool for the Obama administration, enhancing its ability to legitimately deliberate over the use of drones in any given situation. As University of Texas Law professor Robert Chesney argues, “The matrix appears to be a management tool to improve the efficiency of how existing policy gets implemented, not a substantive policy change in its own right...It certainly is a good thing to create an information management tool that makes certain that officials across agencies and departments can have real-time, comprehensive understanding of the options available (practically, legally, diplomatically, etc.) in the event specific persons turn up in specific places. A critical thing, in fact.”166 Chesney’s argument speaks to the nature of the disposition matrix as a rhetorical tool, as do arguments from critics of the matrix. Glenn Greenwald, writing for The Guardian, has argued that:

What has been created here - permanently institutionalized - is a highly secretive executive branch agency that simultaneously engages in two functions: (1) it collects and analyzes massive amounts of surveillance data about all Americans without any judicial review let alone search warrants, and (2) creates and implements a "matrix" that determines the "disposition" of suspects, up to and including execution, without a whiff of due process or oversight. It is simultaneously a surveillance state and a secretive, unaccountable judicial body that analyzes who you are and then decrees what should be done with you, how you should be "disposed" of, beyond the reach of any minimal accountability or transparency.167

While Greenwald’s argument focuses on the inclusion of American citizens in the database, his implications are global. And these implications for governance become even more transparent in the February 2013 release of a Department of Justice (DOJ) “white paper” associated with the disposition matrix.

NBC News released the white paper on February 5, 2013 and within hours the document’s release was viral across the Internet. Intended as a supplement for the disposition matrix, the document details the circumstances under which the U.S. government can target American citizens around the world as a part of the drone program. The document claims:

The President has the authority to respond to the imminent threat posed by al- Qa’ida and its associated forces, arising from the constitutional responsibility to protect the country, the inherent right of the United States to national self defense under international law, Congress’s authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy, and the existence of an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida under international law. Based on these authorities, the President may use force against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces. As detailed in this white paper, in defined circumstances, a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen who has joined al-Qa’ida or its associated forces would be lawful under U.S. and international law...Were the target of a lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment, that individual’s citizenship would not immunize him from a lethal operation.168

While specific names from the disposition matrix such as Anwar al-‘Awlaqī are not noted, the white paper casts a broad net in articulating the legality and process for targeting killings and the use of the disposition matrix in global contexts. Additionally, it further reinforces the subject position into which terrorist suspects are inscribed, as well as their “associated forces.”

The disposition matrix functions as a component of the rhetoricoviolence of drones, not just in its attempt to streamline and justify a legal cause for drone operation and deployment, but in its ability (as a rhetorical form) to materially adjust circumstances of violence and in doing so, (re)generate rhetorical situations. Here, Chaput’s position on the rhetorical situation is helpful only insofar as it is understood materially as a fluid and dynamic space for the merging of two key elements of rhetoric: timing and contingency.

Kairos has long been understood in rhetorical circles as the intersection of time, moment, and event, and as a key component of even the earliest incarnations of rhetorical studies. Edward Schiappa notes, “kairos is a term that can safely be identified as belonging to the early conceptual development of rhetorical theory.”169 E.C. White describes kairos as “a passing instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved.”170 Perhaps no better description could be made of precisely what the Obama administration seeks to achieve in the rhetorical form of the disposition matrix. Here, the matrix plots the appearance of openings through which the force of lethal violence via drone strike aim for success to be achieved, in this case a subject to be disposed. Its presence as a rhetorical form within the circulation of the drone program is truly an exemplar of kairos at work.

Contingency is best represented in the new release of DOJ white papers. Aristotle’s Rhetoric argued early on that rhetoric’s realm operated solely on the contingent, as he noted the “unavoidable and potentially unmanageable presence of multiple possibilities.” Since deliberation would be useless in cases of the impossible or pre-determined, it was the very presence of contingency that prompted Aristotle to turn his focus to studying rhetoric. Lloyd Bitzer extends Aristotle’s claims in his work on rhetoric and situation, arguing that one assumption that can always be made about rhetoric is that it is “is a method for inquiring into and communicating about the contingent.”171 The rising uncertainty expressed in Western journalism about the legality and process of the drone program had at its center one of several prominent arguments, in this case about the potential killing of American citizens in drone strikes without due process of law guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The DOJ’s white paper, as a rhetorical form, points to the manner in which rhetoricoviolence constructs a contingent space. When discourse and violence travel together, in the space that is rhetoricoviolence, and in the case of the U.S. drone program, the institutional system will take measures to re(generate) and normalize ongoing forms of technological warfare. This normalization will serve to create reasonable, contingent ways of documenting subjects legitimated as killable, surveilling them, and ultimately disposing of them in a kairotic fashion. Using rhetorical cartography, we can begin to map the dynamic process by which productive work may occur in understanding problems of social publics such as drone use in the war on terror. This work bears fruit already in the three conclusions herein, but requires continual and vigilant mapping of the remainder of the Obama administration’s term and beyond with regard to unmanned aerial warfare.

#### This rendering of the ballot attends to the unique confinements and constraints of both our current socio-political occasion but also this specific occasion and space of debate.

Bowers 2011 (C.A. Bowers, University of Oregon. *Ecologically and Culturally Informed Educational Reforms in Teacher Education and Curriculum Studies.* Critical Education. Volume 2 Number 14 December 20, 2011 ISSN 1920-4125)

Classroom teachers and university professors do not have the political and economic power to challenge directly the global agenda of the military/corporate/religious alliances that are aggressively promoting a consumer-dependent lifestyle and winning converts in countries where political expediency dictates emulating the Western model of development. But teachers and professors can discuss the political, economic, and technological developments with students in the hope that it will raise awareness and thus the need for them to become more active in the political process—one that seems now to be heavily tilted to the advantage of corporations in exercising even more control over the federal and state governments.¶ Given the slippery political slope we are now on, and the increasing perils that await classroom teachers who deviate from the test-driven curriculum and the market liberal and libertarian ideologies promoted by members of local school boards, it is still possible to introduce reforms that focus on educating students about the local alternatives to a consumer-dependent lifestyle—which is, to reiterate a key point, the lifestyle that requires exploiting the earth’s natural systems and the economic colonization of other cultures. It is also the lifestyle that is dependent upon an industrial culture that is being radically transformed by information technologies. The Internet now enables corporations to ship jobs overseas to low-wage regions of the world, while computer-driven automation enables corporations to replace workers with machines that can run twenty-four hours a day, and do not require health insurance and other human costs. In effect, the consumer- dependent lifestyle that was based upon the assumption of lifetime employment is now only a possibility for the people who are highly educated, and for people who will perform the low-paying, low-status work that cannot be automated. The drive to further automate all levels of work, from the conceptual to the manual, means that everybody’s economic future is now insecure and dependent upon corporate policies for maximizing their profits. Professors have a great many more opportunities to raise questions, to address the cultural roots of the ecological and cultural crises, and to introduce students to alternative lifestyles that are less dependent upon consumerism—if they chose to do so. But this may also change, as the less expensive online courses begin to have the same impact on universities that online news has had on the country’s traditional newspapers.

# 2nc cards

#### The role of the ballot is to render decision upon the means of inquiry adequate to the task of the intellectual in our current socio-political occasion. Professor Jeanette McVicker adds…[[3]](#footnote-3)

*The political task of our time, according to Agamben, is to intervene in consumer capitalism's relentless effort to capture "pure means" and render them "unprofanable." This seems particularly urgent when such "pure means" involve language and the media's ability to construct reality. The argument is, as I hope to have demonstrated, a profoundly important extension on Heidegger's understanding of modernity as the graspability of the world as picture. By engaging in such an ontological critique of journalism's residual commitment to enframement-the capture of "pure means"-the capitalist-expansionist version of the exceptional narrative-the institution of journalism (including educators, practitioners, and critics) might truly renew a journalism that has exhausted its primary paradigms, particularly the fact-driven model that takes objectivity as its emblem.*

Nietzsche warns: *“Beware that, when fighting monsters, you yourself do not become a monster...*

#### As Baudrillard puts it…

IT IS THEIR LIVES AND DEATHS that the terrorist are laying on the line, at the highest possible cost. It is everything by which a human being retains some value in his own eyes that we (the West) are deliberately sacrificing. Our potlatch is one of baseness, shameless, obscenity, debasement and abjection. This is the whole movement of our culture – it is here that we raise the stakes. Our truth is always to be sought in unveiling, de-sublimation, reductive analysis – it is the truth of the repressed, of exhibition, of confession, of laying bare. Nothing is true if it is not de-sacralized, objectivized, shorn of its aura, dragged on to the stage. Our potlatch is the potlatch of indifference – an in-differentiation of values, but also an indifference to ourselves. If we cannot lay our own lives on the line, this is because we are already dead.

And it is this indifference and abjection that we throw out to the others as challenge, the challenge to debase themselves in their turn, to deny their own values, to lay themselves bare, to make their confessions, to own up – in short, to respond with a nihilism equal to our own.[[4]](#footnote-4)

#### And he continues…

BAUDRILLARD: You've only to take the 'zero deaths' formula, a basic concept of the security order. It's clear that this equates mathematically to 'zero lives'. By warding off death at all costs (burdensome medical treatment, genetics, cloning), we're being turned, through security, into living dead. On the pretext of immortality, we're moving towards slow extermination. It's the destiny of maximum good, of absolute happiness, to lead to a zero outcome. Illusion, that is to say, evil, is vital. When you exchange this vital illusion for the unconditional promotion of Good, then you're heading for a blowback from the accursed share. This is how things are getting better and better and, at the same time, worse and worse. ([[5]](#footnote-5))

#### And yet, we continue to strive for zero-death at the expense of life itself.

Baudrillard 1993 (Jean, The Transparency of Evil, Pages 81-82)

Terrorism in all its forms is the transpolitical mirror of evil. For the real problem, the only problem, is: where did Evil go? And the answer is: everywhere - because the anamorphosis of modern forms of Evil knows no bounds. In a society which seeks - by prophylactic measures, by annihilating its own natural referents, by whitewashing violence, by exterminating all germs and all of the accursed share, by performing cosmetic surgery on the negative - to concern itself solely with quantified management and with the discourse of the Good, in a society where it is no longer possible to speak Evil, Evil has metamorphosed into all the viral and terroristic forms that obsess us.

 Confronting the entire world, his tally utterly negative in the distribution of political, military and economic forces, the Ayatollah had but one weapon at his disposal, yet that weapon, though it had no material reality, came close to being the absolute weapon: the principle of Evil. The negation of all Western values - of progress, rationality, political ethics, democracy, and so on. By rejecting the universal consensus on all these Good Things, Khomeini became the recipient of the energy of Evil, the Satanic energy of the rejected, the glamour of the accursed share. He alone now holds the tribune because he alone has upheld against all comers the Machiavellian principle of Evil, because he alone is ready to speak Evil and exorcize Evil, because he alone allows himself to incarnate that principle on the basis of terror. His motivations are unintelligible to us. On the other hand, we cannot fail to recognize the superiority that his posture assures him over a West where the possibility of evoking Evil does not exist and every last trace of negativity is smothered by the virtual consensus that prevails. Our political authorities themselves are but mere shadows of their declared functions. For power exists solely by virtue of its symbolic ability to designate the Other, the Enemy, what is at stake, what threatens us, what is Evil. Today this ability has been lost, and, correspondingly, there exists no opposition able or willing to designate power as Evil. We have become very weak in terms of Satanic, ironic, polemical and antagonistic energy; our societies have become fanatically soft - or softly fanatical. By hunting down all of the accursed share in ourselves and allowing only positive values free rein, we have made ourselves dramatically vulnerable to even the mildest of viral attacks, including that of the Ayatollah - who, for one, is not suffering from immunodeficiency. What is more, we end up treating Khomeini, in the name of the rights of man, as 'Absolute Evil' (Mitterrand) - in other words, we respond to his imprecation in its own terms, something which runs counter to the rules of any enlightened discourse. (Do we now ever describe a mad person as 'mad? As a matter of fact, we are so terrified of Evil, so greedy for euphemisms to denote the Other, misfortune, or other irreducibles, that we no longer even refer to a cripple as such.) Little wonder, then, that someone capable of speaking the language of Evil literally, even triumphantly, should have precipitated such an attack of weak knees among Western cultures (all the petitions of the intellectuals notwithstanding). The fact is that legality, good conscience and even reason itself end up collaborating with the curse. They have no choice but to call down all the resources of anathema, but by that very fact they fall into the trap of the principle of Evil, which is contagious in its essence. So who won? The Ayatollah, unquestionably. of course we still have the power to destroy him, but on the symbolic level he is the victor, and symbolic power is always superior to the power of arms and money. This is, in a way, the revenge of the Other World. The Third World has never been able to throw down a real challenge to the West. As for the USSR, which for several decades incarnated Evil for the West, it is obviously in the process of quietly lining up on the side of Good, on the side of an extremely moderate way of managing things. (By a marvellous irony the USSR has even put itself forward as mediator between the West and the Satan of Teheran, having defended western values for five years in Afghanistan without anyone quite realizing it.)

#### The 1AC omits and obscure the relational geographies of colonial violence inherent in the ongoing war on terror and Indigenous populations. This performative gesture of whiteness simultaneously promote an active forgetting and repetition of supremacy that sets the stage for all acts of state sponsored terrorism, perpetual warfare, and a unique form of Biopolitical racism that threatens ecocide.

Pugliese 2013 (Joseph, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University, Sydney. State violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of torture, black sites, drones. “Genocidal caesurae and the militarization of Native American country” Pages 46-55)

The articulation of a series of carceral and genocidal caesurae predicated on biopolitically separating out the human/culture from the animal/vestibule must be tracked back to those foundational moments of colonial violence that continue to shape and inform the US nation. Spillers' concept of the vestibule works to articulate a defining feature of colonial violence; specifically, a seriality of power that survives by being flexible and adaptive to different geopolitical sites and bodies. Moreover, this colonial violence must be seen, in the context of the US's ongoing war on terror, as operating at once intra- and internationally; the two categories conjoined through the concept of 'relational geographies.' 'Relational geographies' is a term coined by Trevor Paglen in his detailed identification and mapping of 'black sites,' that is, secret government and military sites that are beyond public scrutiny and accountability. One of the black sites that Paglen discusses is Nellis Range, Nevada, occupying Western Shoshone land. Created in 1940, Nellis Range has been described as 'the single largest gunnery range in the world' and 'the single largest "peacetime militarized zone on earth." The Western Shoshone peoples, the traditional owners of this land, call the Western Shoshone nation 'the most bombed nation on earth.’ In his analysis of Nellis Range, which houses one of the ground control centres for the international operation of drones, Paglen insistently draws attention to the past history of white colonial invasion and violent displacement of the Native Americans of the region and the contemporary relations of violence exercised by the US state in their ongoing persecution of Indigenous Americans attempting to claim back lands sequestered by the US government in their establishment of black sites and areas for nuclear weapons testing. He describes being welcomed into a trailer in Crescent Valley, Nevada, that was home to the Western Shoshone Defense Project, and from this remote location, an elderly Native American woman named Carrie Dann and her staff of two full-timers and two part-timers take on the milita1y, the Bureau of Land Management, mining and defense contractors, and the US government itself. Dann says that the United States has been illegally occupying Western Shoshone land for 150 years and that she has the paperwork to prove it. ¶ Paglen documents the repeated violent raids that Dann and her people are compelled to endure. The US state has repeatedly attempted to charge Dann and her people with trespassing on government land. This a charge that Dann derisively rejects, arguing that she cannot be accused of trespassing 'land she saw as rightly belonging to her people ' precisely because 'the Shoshone NEVER gave, ceded, or sold their land to the United States government, by treaty or otherwise.¶ In the face of this defiance, the US government has attempted to crush Western Shoshone resistance by deploying the full arsenal of state terror; including federal agents, helicopters, a plane and a fleet of All-Terrain Vehicles: ' "I could not help but think of how this is how our ancestors felt when they saw the cavalry coming. So many of my people were killed on this land and now it's happening again." The Feds rounded up Dann's cattle and loaded them into trucks to be sold at auction. The ranch was devastated. Paglen connects this national exercise of contemporary colonialism and state-violence to the larger, transnational picture he has been delineating in order to underscore the system of continuities that hold between the two: ‘For the collection of [Native American] activist sitting in an unmarked trailer in the recesses of Nevada's vast valleys, the black world is much more than an array of sites connected through black aircraft, encrypted communications, and classified careers. It is the power to create geographies, to create places where anything can happen, and to do it with impunity. 'The enormity of this power to create geographies while simultaneously obliterating others is perhaps best exemplified by the Pentagon's ambitious proposal to create a virtual 'drone state' that will further expropriate large tracts of Native American land, creating 'the largest Joint Forces Future Combat Systems training site in the world' 'Under this plan, 7 million acres (or 11,000 square miles) of land in the southwest corner of Colorado, and 60 million acres of air space (or 94,000 square miles) over Colorado and New Mexico would be given over to special forces testing and training in the use of remote-controlled flying machines. Paglen's concept of 'relational geographies' can be productively amplified by conjoining it with the concept of 'relational temporalities,' that is, diachronic relations that establish critical connections across historical time and diverse geographies.¶ Relational temporalities draw lines of connection between seemingly disparate temporal events: for example, the US state's genocidal history against Native Americans and the killing of civilians in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan. In her tracking of the violent history of attempted genocide against Native Americans, Andrea Smith writes: 'the US is built on a foundation of genocide, slavery, and racism.' Situated in this context, what becomes apparent in the scripting of the 9/ 11 attacks as the worst acts of terrorism perpetrated on US soil is the effective erasure of this foundational history of state-sponsored terrorism against Native Americans. This historicidal act of whitewashing effectively clears the ground for contemporary acts of violence against the United States to be chronologically positioned as the 'first' or hierarchically ranked as the 'worst' in the nation's history. The colonial nation-state deploys, in the process, a type of Nietzschean 'active forgetting' that ensures the obliteration of prior histories of massacre and terror such as the catastrophic Trail of Tears that resulted from the Indian Removal Act of 1830. This Act enabled the forced removal of a number of Native American nations and their relocation to Oklahoma; in the process, at least four thousand Native Americans died. The Trail of Tears has been described as ‘the largest instance of ethnic cleansing in American history. This example of state terror is what must be occluded in order to preserve the ‘innocence’ of the nation so that it can subsequently claim, post 9/11, to have lost the very thing it had betrayed long ago. Jimmie Durham remarks on the repetition of this national ruse: 'The US, because of its actual guilt . . . has had a nostalgia for itself since its beginnings. Even now one may read editorials almost daily about America's "loss of innocence" at some point or other, and about some time in the past when America was truly good. That self-righteousness and insistence upon innocence began, as the US began, with invasion and murder.¶ Such acts of white historicide are constituted by a double logic of taken-forgrantedness and obsessive repetition. Steve Martinot and Jared Sexton, in their forensic analysis of the operations of white supremacy, articulate the seemingly contradictory dimensions of this double logic:¶ It is the same passive apparatus of whiteness that in its mainstream guise actively forgets that it owes its existence to the killing and terrorizing of those it racialises for that purpose, expelling them from the human fold in the same gesture of forgetting. It is the passivity of bad faith that tacitly accepts as 'what goes without saying' the postulates of white supremacy. And it must do so passionately since 'what goes without saying' is empty and can be held as a 'truth' only through an obsessiveness. The truth is that the truth is on the surface, flat and repetitive, just as the law is made by the uniform.¶ The it 'goes without saying' is the moment in which the very ideology of white supremacy is so naturalized as to become invisible: it is the given order of the world. Yet, in order to maintain this position of supremacy, a logic of tireless iteration must be deployed in order to secure the very everyday banality, and thus transparency, of white supremacy's daily acts of violence. For those in a position to exercise these daily rounds of state violence, their performative acts are banal because of their very quotidian repetition; yet, because their racialized targets continue to exercise, in turn, acts of resistance and outright contestation, these daily acts of state violence must be obsessively reiterated. Underpinning such acts of white supremacist violence and historicidal erasures is the official - government, media and academic - positioning of Native Americans as a 'permanent "present absence" ' that, in Smith's words, 'reinforces at every turn the conviction that Native peoples are indeed vanishing and that the conquest of Native lands is justified. Precisely what gets erased in the process are the contemporary Indian wars that are being fought across the body of the US nation. These are wars that fail to register as 'wars' because the triumphant non-indigenous polity controls the ensemble of institutions - legal, military, media and so on - that fundamentally determines what will count as a 'war' in the context of the nation.¶ In her work, Smith establishes critical points of connection between the war on terror being waged in Afghanistan or Pakistan and the issue of Indigenous sovereignty within the context of the US nation: 'it is important to understand that the war against "terror" is really an attack against Native sovereignty, and that consolidating US empire abroad is predicated on consolidating US empire within US borders. For example, the Bush administration continues to use the war on terror as an excuse to support anti-immigration policies and the militarization of the US/Mexico border.' The exercise of the war on terror becomes, in other words, another way of entrenching and legitimating the usurpation of Native American sovereignty in the name of the colonial nation-state. The militarization of the US's borders has seen the Department of Homeland Security oversee the domestic transposition of military technologies such as drones - that have been used to fight the war on terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa - to the borders of both Mexico and Canada. Ted Poe, Congressman, 2nd District of Texas, has introduced legislation that 'mandates the Secretary of Defense transfer 10 % of eligible returning equipment from Iraq to state and local law enforcement agencies for border security purposes. Operative here is what Roberto Lovato has termed 'ICE's [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] Al Qaedaization of immigrants and immigration policy: building a domestic security apparatus, one made possible by multi-billion contracts to military-industrial companies like Boeing, General Electric, and Halliburton. '73 The massive scale of this militarization of US borders becomes evident in the context of a recent US government report on border security that states that 'The Department of Homeland security (DHS) has the largest enforcement air force in the world . . . As of September 2011, OAM [Office of Air and Marine] had approximately 267 aircraft, 301 marine vessels, and 1,843 personnel in 70 locations primarily on the southwest, northern and southeast borders. The deployment of such militarized border technologies creates a virtual fence that effectively amplifies the securitizing effects of the concrete and steel fence that is already in place in many sections of the US Mexico border. Understood in Smith’s terms, the militarization of the US border and the repulsion of attendant ‘aliens’ constitute a re-assertion of colonial sovereignty.¶ The connection between two seemingly disconnected categories - the US state's conduct of contemporary wars and Native American sovereignty over country - comes into sharp focus in Winona LaDuke's delineation of the violent relational geographies and temporalities that continue to inscribe the operations of the colonial state:¶ The modern US military has taken our lands for bombing exercises and military bases, and for the experimentation and storage of the deadliest chemical agents and toxins known to mankind . . . The military has named our communities after forts that once held our people captive and used our tribal names to link military equipment with fierce warrior imagery, such as the Blackhawk, Kiowa and Apache helicopters. As the Seventh Cavalry invaded Iraq in 2003 in the 'Shock and Awe' campaign that opened the war, one could not help note that this was the name of the cavalry division that had murdered 300 men, women and children at Wounded Knee .75¶ As LaDuke notes, the colonial state continues to exercise its power of conquest and domination through the exercise of both physical - expropriation of Native American land - and symbolic - expropriation and misuse of Native American names - violence. The war on terror has seen the names of Native American tribes and leaders violently inscribed in atrocities such as the killing of fourteen civilians (who tried twice to surrender as they were being pursued) in Iraq by two Apache helicopters known in US military jargon as Crazy Horse elements - Crazy Horse was the Oglala Lakota warrior who led his people against the colonial invasion of their lands. The iterative logic of the colonial nomenclature of occupation and conquest, that has its roots in the wars against Native Americans, is evidenced by the naming of the US colonial war in the Philippines as 'lnjun warfare, ' and the declaration that the islands would not be secure 'until the niggers are killed off like the lndians '; and the naming by the US military of Vietnam, at the time of the Vietnam War, as 'Indian Country,' and Vietnamese as 'Indians.' More recently, Iraq was termed by the US military as the 'Wild West' and the fortress in Shkin, Afghanistan, as the 'Alamo." Perhaps the most flagrant example of this symbolic violence is the code-naming of Osama bin Laden as ' Geronimo' :¶ The president and his advisers watched Leon E. Panetta, the CIA director, on a video screen, narrating from his agency's headquarters across the Potomac River what was happening in faraway Pakistan.¶ 'They've reached the target,' he said.¶ Minutes passed.¶ 'We have a visual on Geronimo,' he said.¶ A few minutes later: ' Geronimo EKIA.'¶ Enemy Killed in Action. There was silence in the Situation Room.¶ Finally, the president spoke up.¶ 'We got him.’¶ Another report quotes the following: a 'Seal then shot bin Laden in the chest and again in the head with his M4 rifle, and said over his radio: "For God and country - Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo" - the code word for a hit on bin Laden. '81 In this pivotal moment of the war on terror, the Indian wars are contemporized and re-situated at the symbolic heart of this war. The visual of bin Laden is encoded as Geronimo, iconic leader of the Chiricahua Apache in the anti-colonial Apache Wars. Through this loaded act of superimposition, the Native American warrior is criminalized, conceptually recoded as a terrorist, and the Native American wars against colonial invasion of their lands are scripted as the wars of domestic terrorists.¶ Geronimo, as enemy killed in action, is symbolically executed by the US state in the guise of a contemporary terrorist. This is the moment in which the US state reappropriates and secures its imperial sovereignty - precisely through a double death; a twin execution that topologically locates its absolute outside (Arab/Muslim terrorist) as already inside (Native American insurgent). Geronimo, through this discursive resignification and double death, is transmuted into the trophy of a triumphant imperial power that cannot vanquish too many times its anti-colonial insurgents: even when they are long dead, as in Geronimo's case, they must be killed again. In a profound meditation on the ongoing cultural valency of Geronimo in US culture, Durham writes: 'In the American myth, Apaches are a symbol of inscrutable cruelty. Is Geronimo's name invoked because he evokes American fear - a fear that has been "conquered"? If so, then the fearsome "object" has obviously not been conquered at all. 'Geronimo, in this neo-imperial reincarnation, is the revnant that cannot be killed: as ghost of a dense, unresolved history of colonial violence, he continues to reanimate the colonist’s symbolic imaginary and to haunt its very claims to legitimacy. Activated in this heavily mediated moment or state assassination is a palimpsest of repetitions, slippages and collisions of signs, histories and subjects. The historically anachronistic enunciation - 'we have a visual on Geronimo' - violently sutures two heterogeneous faces in the process of collapsing two radically different geopolitical histories. This same enunciation, as a moment of obsessive repetition, discloses the state's tendency to homogenize its various others as interchangeably Other. It also exposes, however, the undiminished contestatory power that Geronimo still magnetizes so that he must be 'killed' once again in order to silence questions about the sovereign legitimacy of the colonial nation-state.¶ The symbolic, colonial re-killing of Geronimo discloses yet another form of death. This other form of death refers to that living death that embodies, in Fanon's terms, the contemporary existence of the colonized:¶ There is first of all, the fact that the colonized . . . perceives life not as a flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against death. This ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, unemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex and the absence of any hope for the future. All this gnawing at the existence of the colonized tends to make life something of an incomplete death.¶ As the trophy of a triumphant colonialism, Geronimo revenant embodies the incomplete death of Native Americans surviving ongoing regimes of economic, cultural and political expropriation and ecological devastation, as a form of ecocide, that contemporizes the traditional genocidal practices of the colonial state. The ecocide that has been visited upon Native Americans assumes the form of weapons testing, mining and the dumping of the toxic waste of the colonizers on their lands and in their rivers . Within the ecologically devastated spaces that now constitute the lands of the Western Shoshone nation called Newe Sogobia, the biopolitical caesura of human/ animal positions its captive subjects along a violent hierarchy of life and death. In the words of an Owens Valley Paiute elder, Native Americans are viewed by white authorities as 'nonpeople' and thus, through the deployment of a form of 'environmental racism,' they are scripted as expendable by both the US government and the various corporations that conduct their ecocidal operations on their land.**¶** The extensive picture of the nuclear testing program has unfolded in the lands of Newe Sogobia includes the exposure of the Western Shonhone to the toxic fallout of the tests: the experimental use of live pigs, dressed in army uniforms to see how they would withstand the blast, filmed by 'the remote-controlled camera [that] captured the pigs writhing and squealing as they died,' and a 'herd of horses that wandered east onto the Sheahan lands with their eyes burnt out, left empty sockets by a blast. These haunting images of useless suffering evidence the disposable lives of those subjects violently cut off from 'the culture' and positioned in the lethal vestibule of the colonizer. In this exercise of state violence, the targets of the state 's speciesism (immolated pigs and blinded horses) and raciospeciesism (Native Americans as 'nonpeople ') live and die under the decree of the biopolitical caesura. For Carrie Dann and her sister Mary, the lived violence of this biopolitical categorization and partitioning is encapsulated by the fact that, as Native Americans, they are 'under the jurisdiction of a department that otherwise manages "natural resources" - trees, animals, parks, and so forth.’ The Dann sisters spell out the ramifications of this biopolitical assignation and its attendant caesura: 'I don't know if we 're the human species or some other kind of species,' says Dann, to which her sister Mary sardonically replies: 'Endangered species.’¶ The US policies of colonial appropriation of lndian lands and the sequestration of Native Americans into camps were conducted under the imprimatur of territorial laws guaranteed by what Charles Venator Santiago terms 'the anti-democratic nature of the US Constitution. ' These territorial laws have enabled the US state to appropriate Indigenous lands and to legitimate the governance of the resulting 'distinct spaces in an anomalous manner' so that freedoms, rights and so on can be effectively suspended. The US colonial state's biopolitical regime of governance was underpinned by at least three key features: imperial westward expansion, as formally proclaimed by the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, a doctrine crucially underpinned by the violence of that biopolitical caesura which effectively 'determined that natives of the world are as animals and therefore have no human rights'; the consequent coercive relocation of Native Americans onto lands rejected by white America because they were arid, remote and barren; and the spectacular growth of the US military during the course of the twentieth century. As Gregory Hooks and Chad Smith note, 'This contingent intersection of lndian conquest and the rise of the Pentagon placed Native Americans at great risk of exposure to noxious military activity' - precisely because they were located on those very lands that were contiguous to military installations that practiced the full range of toxic and environmentally destructive activities. This genocidal form of governance of Native Americans has been critically enabled by the state’s deployment of a biopolitical caesura that, in its lethal human/animal division, has ensured that Indigenous peoples can be left to die within the ecocidal landscapes generated by the military-industrial complex and its economies of war.

#### Professor Natalie Bormann explains- that our very discussions about drone policy are already pre-figured by the excessive logic of drone.

~~Bormann 2006 (Natalie Bormann Visiting Assistant Professor The Global Security Program Watson Institute, ISA Conference in San Diego, March 22-25, 2006 Panel on ‘Reading Outer Space’)~~

What should be clear by now is that material space is ‘preconstructed’ (to borrow this phrase from Bourdieu). According to Virilio, it is the technical that precedes the spatial. The possibility of new military technology underpins the ways we invent and organize our environments. And it is the effects of technology which produces Outer Space and authorizes contingent action in support of weaponization.25 The new technologies that allow us to penetrate Outer Space are producing new domains of experience and new modes of representations and perception.¶ Now, that technology is deeply infatuated with current policies in Outer Space comes to no surprise, and we find ourselves amidst visions of ‘hyper-spectral imagery’, ‘advanced electro-optical warning sensors’, and ‘space-based radars and lasers’. But how does it relate to space? Virilio is clear on this: For once, these technologies shrink the planet (and space outwith the planet); and they do so in various ways and to various prevail. One of the most striking ways is the loss of geo-strategic strong points, since from any given spot – ground, air, exo-atmospheric – we can now use technology to reach and destroy each other. The author explains: ‘Today, the abolition of distances in time by various means [of communications and telecommunications] result in a confusion’, whereby space suffers from ‘torsion and distortion, in which the most elementary reference points disappear one by one’.26 Outer Space plays a key role in the ‘real-time’ enhancement of military operations on a global scale; satellites are not only used to spot targets as they emerge and transmit data but they also allow us to offset weapons that meet these targets anywhere and at any time. It is a well-known fact that Outer Space provided key

# 1nr cards

**Key to stop error replication**

**Adams 11** – \*Lecturer in Education and Program Director, Centre for Educational Studies, Univ. of Hull

(Paul, “From ‘ritual’ to ‘mindfulness’: policy and pedagogic positioning,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, January 2011, 32: 1, 57-69)

With such concerns, and many others in mind, it has become fashionable to describe policy in terms of discourse. Whilst by no means an agreed field (cf. Bacchi, 2000) policy as discourse does provide grounds for further consideration of the interplay between policy creation and response. As a challenge to the view that policy, as a manifestation of knowledge, arises either in the individual or in the natural world, we can consider the work of Kenneth Gergen (1995) and his proposal that all knowing arises in the social processes of language use and meaning-making. Here, rather than construe policy as the accurate expression of dispassionate, unbiased observations, such a view shifts our relationship with policy from a means by which the individual might comprehend the significance of the policy statement in terms of truth to an understanding that the language used within the policy statements itself actively constructs the world to which it pertains. Put another way, Gergen’s view invites us to consider policy as having a ‘performative’ function and that that presented is neither a true representation of reality nor an accurate reflection of intent. Accordingly, policy can no longer be simply said to be understood and applied. Alternatively, this perspective construes policy as a representation of the interplay between the policy text (the material embodiment of the policy document and associated forms), discursive practices involved in the production, distribution and consumption of policy, and wider social practices which delineate, for example ‘professional’ and, indeed, other roles and associated activities. This view acknowledges the parts played by history and culture in determining specific ways of viewing the world whilst illuminating how understanding is dependent upon prevailing social and economic arguments (after Burr, 2003). Policy, then, should not be seen as an accurate portrayal of some pre-existing status but is, rather, a social construction given legitimacy through the permission it gives to speak. Policy as discourse is, therefore, an interplay between ‘conceptual schema attached to specific historical, institutional and cultural contexts . . . [and] . . . the differential power of some actors’ (Bacchi, 2000, p. 52) to act. With this in mind, it is clear that professional actions undertaken in relation to policy appear, not as objective responses to positions of truth, but rather as subjective realisations borne out of cultural, historical, economic and social specificity. Policy as discourse attends to both the uses and effects of policy insomuch as it considers the influences pertaining to the creation of the policy text, the mechanisms by which this is imported into the professional lifeworld and the prevailing social conditions which form the very language used to describe the policy itself, as well as associated roles and identities; in short, policy as social construction. This view is not new; much has been written from this perspective. On this matter, Bacchi notes the tendency of this perspective to: Concentrate on the ability of some groups rather than others to make discourse, and on some groups rather than others as effected or constituted in discourse. To put the point briefly, those who are deemed to ‘hold’ power are portrayed as the ones making discourse, whereas those who are seen as ‘lacking’ power are described as constituted in discourse. (2000, p. 52) This redistribution of voice constitutes certain voices as meaningful or authoritative (Ball, 2006, p. 49). This social construction of policy requires an appreciation that the processes of problematisation and argumentation are the lifeblood of policy existence. The lenses offered by history, culture and economics through which ‘problems’ to be solved are identified determine not only the mechanisms by which ‘reality’ might be understood but also the very ‘problems’ themselves. Further, it is through the process of argumentation that certain solutions are presented as viable alternatives. Crucially, as Hastings (1998, p. 194) notes, this ‘highlights the instrumentality of the process of problem construction not only to successful policy making, but also to sustaining systems of belief about the nature of social reality’. Problem construction is, then, ‘as much a way of knowing and a way of acting strategically as a form of description’ (Edelman, 1988, p. 36). In this regard, policy as discourse establishes a number of key principles. First, it articulates a view that ‘problems’ do not exist as pre-human issues to be addressed but rather that they are the products of political reasoning located in economic, social, cultural and historical ways of viewing the world. Second, that these lenses also provide the means by which solutions, that is to say the pronouncements ‘captured’ as policy imperatives, might be constructed. Third, and most importantly, policy as discourse, through its recognition of cultural, historical, economic and social specificity, constrains the scope of both policy construction and policy response (Ball, 2006). Put briefly, discourse presents a variety of representations from which action might be chosen: Discourses are about what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority. Discourses embody the meaning and use of propositions and words. Thus certain possibilities for thought are constructed. (Ball, 2006, p. 48) This world-to-person fit describes the ‘subject position’, determined by the availability of dominant discourses. Interpretational options are thus taken to be both pre-existing and available to the subject. In such a view, human agency occurs through the deployment of the subject’s exercise of choice from the discourses available. In short, through the act of locating oneself within a frame of predetermined potentialities, the subject is said to exercise agentic action.

#### Framework links- it’s a performative example of how they bracket out certain perspectives in favor of hegemonic ones- It’s not just about simulating war powers debates but who has the best method for making war powers debates productive

Sparks 3 Holloway, asst prof of political science, Penn State, Queens, Teens, and Model Mothers Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform (Paperback) by Sanford F. Schram (Editor), Joe Soss (Editor), Richard C. Fording (Editor)

In spite of the participatory principles embodied in these theories, some deliberative democrats have given inadequate attention to the barriers to public sphere participation confronted by marginalized citizens. Activists, dissidents,, racial and ethnic minorities, and particularly poor citizens are regularly excluded from both decision making and deliberative venues, but this problem is often sidestepped in the mainstream theoretical literature by theorists who downplay the effects of social and economic inequality on public participation (see, e.g., Barber 1984; Cohen 1989; Dryzek '99°). The claim that we can effectively bracket inequality in the public sphere, however, has been strongly criticized recently by a group of theorists explicitly concerned with problems of democratic inclusion. These scholars, including James Bohman ('996), Nancy Fraser (r7), Jane Mansbridge (i5ir, 1999), and his Young (1993, 1996, woo), have emphasized the fact that formal political equality does not guarantee equal authority in or even access to the public realm. Iris Young, for example, has identified two forms of exclusion that prevent citizens from fully participating in democracies. What she calls external exclusion "names the many ways that individuals and groups that ought to be included are purposely or inadvertently left out of fora for discussion and decision making" (zooo, 53 54). External exclusion can be as blatant as deliberately failing to invite certain groups to important meetings, or can take more subtle forms such as the way economic inequalities affect access to political institutions. As Nancy Fraser has noted, in societies like the United States in which the publication and circulation of political views depends on media organizations that are privately owned and operated for profit, those citizens who lack wealth will also generally "lack access to the material means of equal participation". This criticism has obvious salience for families living on welfare budgets. On a more basic level, money and time are also necessary for participation in putatively "free" political institutions. Poor parents with young children, for example, might not have the resources to purchase child care in order to attend a town council meeting at which important political decisions are made.3 Internal exclusions, in contrast, "concern ways that people lack effective opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision making" (Young 2000, 55; emphasis added). Citizens may find that "others ignore or dismiss or patronize their statements and expressions. Though formally included in forum or process, people may find that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect" (fl). Internal exclusion can take the form of public ridicule or face to face inattention (Bickford 5996), but it can also stem from less obvious sources, such as the norms of articulateness, dispassionateness, and orderliness that are often privileged in political discussions (Young 2ooo, 6). As Young observes, In many formal situations the better educated white middle class people often act as though they have a right to speak and that their words carry authority, whereas those of other groups often feel intimidated by the argument requirements and the formality and rules of parliamentary procedure, so they do not speak, or speak only in a way that those in charge find "disruptive." . . . The dominant groups, moreover, often fail entirely to notice this devaluation and silencing, while the less privileged often feel put down or frustrated, either losing confidence in themselves or becoming angry. (5996, 114) Since "unruly" forms of speech tend to be used primarily by women, racial minorities, and working class people, large groups of citizens face the devaluation of their political participation.

#### Makes violence inevitable- absolves individual complicity

Kappeler 95 Susanne, Associate Professor – Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, p. 10-11

‘We are the war’ does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society—which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of collective irresponsibility1, where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyze the specific and differential responsibilities of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective ‘assumption’ of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility—leading to the –well-known illusion of our apparent ‘powerlessness’ and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens- even more so those of other nations – have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia – since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls ‘organized irresponsibility’, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot ‘do’ anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of ‘What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?’ Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as ‘virtually no possibilities’: what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war’, ‘I want military intervention’, ‘I want to stop this backlash’, or ‘I want a moral revolution.’7 ‘We are this war’, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so—called peace talks, namely as Drakuli~ says, in our non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we ‘are’ the war in our ‘unconscious cruelty towards you’, our tolerance of the ‘fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don’t’ — our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the ‘others’. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape ‘our feelings, our relationships, our values’ according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### They destroys our critical project.

Burke 7 Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security: Ethics and Violence, p. 21-22

A further argument of the CSS thinkers, one that adds a sharply conservative note to their normative discourse, needs comment. This states that proposals for political transformation must be based on an identification of 'immanent possibilities' for change in the present order. Indeed, Richard Wyn Jones is quite, militant about this: [D]escriptions of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias ... If [critical theorists] succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present ... [they] have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. 47 Certainly it is helpful to try to identify such potentials; but whatever the common sense about the practicalities of political struggle this contains, I strongly reject the way Jones frames it so dogmatically. Even putting aside the analytical ambiguities in identifying where immanent possibilities exist, such arguments are ultimately disabling and risk denying the entire purpose of the critical project. It is precisely at times of the greatest pessimism, when new potentials are being shut down or normative change is distinctly negative arguably true of the period in which I am writing - that the critical project is most important. To take just one example from this book, any reader would recognise that my arguments about the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be extremely difficult to 'realise' (even though they endorse a negotiated two-state solution). This only makes it more important to make them because the available contours of the present, confined as they are within the masculinist ontology of the insecure nation-state, fail to provide a stable platform either for peace or a meaningful security. In the face of such obstacles the critical project must think and conceive the unthought, and its limiting test ought not to be realism but responsibility. The realism underlying the idea of immanent possibility sets up an important tension between the arguments of this book and the normative project of cosmopolitanism which was most famously set out by Kant in his Perpetual Peace as the establishment of a 'federation of peoples' based on Republication constitutions and principles of universal hospitality, that might result in the definitive abolition of the need to resort to war. 41 However, Kant's image of universal human community and the elimination of war exists in fundamental tension with its foundation on a 'pacific federation' of national democracies. With two terrible centuries' hindsight we know that republics have not turned out to be pacifistic vehicles of cosmopolitan feeling; instead, in a malign convergence of the social contract with Clausewitzian strategy, they have too often formed into exciusivist communities whose ultimate survival is premised upon violence. Is the nation-state the reality claim upon which cosmopolitanism always founders? Could a critique of security, sovereignty and violence, along the lines I set out here, help us to form a badly needed buttress for its structure?

#### This theoretical framework naturalizes violence and delimits effective inquiry

McCormack 10 Tara McCormack is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster, Critique, Security and Power pp42-46

Problem-solving theory then has two functions. It serves as a guide and an excuse for political elites; a guide because it aims to show elites how they might solve problems arising from a specific set of social and political relations, the ‘given framework for action’, and an excuse as these specific social and political relations are naturalised and presented as eternal and unchanging situations rather than a contingent set of arrangements that are open to change. Problem-solving theory naturalises and removes from questioning the institutions and social and power relations that exist, presenting them as immutable and unchanging facts of life (Cox, 1981: 129). Problem-solving theory, therefore, clearly has a conservative ideological function because it delimits what is legitimate enquiry and any potential for change (1981: 129–130). According to Cox, critical theory can challenge both these aspects of problemsolving theory. Critical theory does not accept the given framework for action. For critical theory this framework itself is subject to critique and questioning. Critical theory begins, like problem-solving theory, with ‘some aspect or particular sphere of human activity’ (1981: 129). Yet whilst problem-solving theory stops at the boundaries, critical theory steps outside of the given framework for action. Critical theory questions the existing institutions and social and power relations which problem-solving theory takes as an unchangeable ‘fact of life’ and tries to explain how and why problems arise by putting them in their broader social, historical, and political context (1981: 129). Critical theory, as Jahn argues, has a methodological requirement of analysing concrete phenomena in their historical and social totality (1998: 614). Critical theory [is] critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about . . . It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts . . . the critical approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved. (Cox, 1981: 129) Critical theory therefore requires a substantive material analysis of the framework for action, the historical structure (Cox, 1981: 135) which gives rise to the problematic considered. Cox here also explicitly identifies critical theory with historical materialism: ‘Historical materialism is, however a foremost source of critical theory’ (1981: 133). For Cox, historical materialism is a particular current within Marxist thought ‘which reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social relations’ (1981: 133). Cox argues that the prevailing international social order (the framework for action or historical structure [1981: 135]) can be understood, abstractly, in terms of the interaction between material capabilities, ideas and institutions (1981: 136). This historical structure influences both human action and theory although not in a direct or entirely deterministic way (1981: 135). As Marx argued, ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted by the past’ (1978b: 595). For Cox, critical theory has another advantage over problem-solving theory in that it understands that the social world is in a constant state of change: ‘Critical theory is a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a constant process of historical change’ (1981: 129). As reality changes we find that the divisions of the social world into separate disciplines may appear arbitrary. Cox gives the example of new kinds of theories that challenge the idea of the state as a coherent actor (1981: 130). Writing in 1981, Cox is referring to pluralism and interdependence theory in the context of the oil crises and the end of the Bretton Woods international financial system. Cox argues that contemporary American realism, which he calls neo-realism, exemplifies the problem-solving approach to theory. Theorists working within this framework have an ahistorical approach which assumes a fixed and unchanging international system**.** For Cox, theory is a way in which we understand and explain the ‘real social world’ (1981: 126). However, Cox argues that the relationship between the social world and the way in which it is perceived and theorised is more complicated than problem-solving theory allows for. For Cox, there is a crucial and complicated relationship between ‘facts’, ‘reality’ and knowledge. ‘Facts’ are not neutral stepping stones on the way to understanding ‘reality’. Theory is not neutral but socially and politically bounded in a complicated way; it reflects, or is a product of, rather than describes actually existing social and political processes. The form that theory takes and the explanations that it gives, arise from and are part of the way in which people attempt to understand the social world and their position in it. Cox argues therefore that theory derives from a given perspective, a specific social, political and economic position, whether of a nation, or class, for example: [Theory is] always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crises, of past expectations, and of hopes and expectations for the future. (1981: 128) At the epistemological level, therefore, problem-solving theory ignores the complicit relationship between theory and the social and political perspective

1. They oversimplify our framework—we’re an analysis of the way that representations and language shape and interact the political structure– our evidence all proves that this is a superior explanatory framework than simple realist analysis.

Timothy Luke, university distinguished professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2003, Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World, p. 104-05

How will international relations unfold in a world with an increasingly globalized economy, many more hollowed-out states, and only one obvious superpower? The regents of neorealist international politics push the traditional primacy of man, the state, and war to account for the present, but this pitch is marred by inconsistencies, presumptions, and inaccuracies. Even so, the institutional grip of mainstream neorealist analysis, as a discursive formation or power/knowledge bloc, on the conduct of international political analysis continues to be quite strong. Can discourse occur without concourse? Is concursivity an integral part of discourse, and discursivity an inseparable part of concourse? Running to-and-fro, the original root meaning of “discourse,” requires some running together, which is the original meaning of “concourse.” And running together entails measures of tacking to-and-fro. Reexamining many international incidents may reveal much about transsocial and transnational concursiveness. Indeed, the breadth and depth of ordinary events need to be more carefully explained to show how eventuation occurs, concurs, and recurs. One must wonder then whether discursive analysis often slips into its own metaphysics of presence, forgetting the vital anchor points into institutionalized structures of action that enable discursive engagements to unfold, as the proponents of discursive analysis have proclaimed. A concern with discursivity, textuality, and language must not ignore how these forces occlude extradiscursivity, subtextuality, and the prelinguistic, which are all equally necessary for accounting for the development of world affairs. Often these matters are presumed away in structures and systems held in the background. The discourses of danger that generate today’s security problematics, for example, also throw forth signs of their coincident concourses for conduct. Even conflict requires collaboration to eventuate how security and insecurity are experienced, effected, or effaced in practices. Discursive approaches to explaining international politics are quite important in accounting for who dominates whom around the globe (Shapiro 1989). Language clearly is a type of action. Speaking organizes activity. And listening, interpreting, and comprehending are all critically significant forms of behavior that shape how countries and corporations interact worldwide. Yet discursive interrelations usually presume many ongoing work relations that make words of discourse inescapable, natural, or routine. It is these occluded connections of interdependent practice that need to be brought out into the open with more complete theoretical articulations of the concursivity that ordinarily underpins discursivity. Such dark matter can be detected in the materiale held by naturalized “black boxes” into which inputs flow and from which outputs come: embedded practices, big sociotechnical systems, and collaborative regimes (Luke 1989). Amid the shadows cast by such structures, concursive practices shape the bulk of behavior between countries under most circumstances. War and peace are both complex sets of practices that require as much ongoing tit-for-tat behavior as they take conflict to occur (Luke 199 la). In war, offense must meet defense, attacks frame counterattacks, and strategic invention always emerges from strategic convention. Without thrust and parry, parry and thrust, war cannot “be made.” Likewise, peace develops as collaboration in action as parties “make peace,” and then “keep the peace” through comediating at many different levels of concursive collaboration, cointerpretation, and cooperation in their activities (Luke 1993).

2. Assumptions are a-priori to questions of politics—before we can formulate questions concerning what we must do- we must first understand the how and why.

Jayan Nayar, shape-shifter, horse whisperer, 1999 (“SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity” **Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Fall, 1999) Lexis**

The description of the continuities of violence in Section II in many ways is familiar to those who adopt a critical perspective of the world. "We" are accustomed to narrating human wrongs in this way. The failures and betrayals, the victims and perpetrators, are familiar to our critical understanding. From this position of judgment, commonly held within the "mainstream" of the "non-mainstream," there is also a familiarity of solutions commonly advocated for transformation; the "marketplace" for critique is a thriving one as evidenced by the abundance of literature in this respect. Despite this proliferation of enlightenment and the profession of so many good ideas, however, "things" appear to remain as they are, or, worse still, deteriorate. And so, the cycle of critique, proposals for transformation and disappointment continues.
Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

Questions of representations come first – the way we discuss policy is more important than policy itself.

Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1996 (*Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines Series, ISBN 0816627622, p. 5-6)

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 6 In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world." Focusing on discursive practices enables [end page 5] one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

#### Epistemology is highly relevant to policy prescription

Sending 4 Ole SENDING Research Fellow @ Norweigan Inst. of Int’l Affairs ‘4 in Global Institutions & Development eds. Morten Boas and Desmond McNeil p. 58-59

Granted that the objectification and definition of a given phenomenon is open to a variety of normative and political considerations, it becomes interesting to explore how scientific knowledge constitutes a symbolic resource used by politically motivated actors. In order to justify and legitimize certain courses of action, and to render these possible and effective, scientific knowledge forms an important component both for efforts of persuading and mobilizing different groups, and for formulating and establishing policy practices. This can he grasped through the concept of poli1y stories. A policy story can be defined as follows: A set of factual, causal claims, normative principles and a desired objective, all of which are constructed as a more or less coherent argument a story which points to a problem to be addressed and the desirability and adequacy of adopting a specific policy approach to resolve it. This conceptualization incorporates how politically motivated actors integrate scientifically produced imowledge in the form of facts, concepts or theories in order to i) convince others that a certain phenomenon is a problem, (ii) demonstrate that this problem is best understood in a certain way as shown by the facts presented, and (iii) link these factual claims to normative principles giving moral force to the argument that it should be resolved. This perspective thus subjects the factual dimensions of political processes to the interests and normative commitments of actors, in the sense that knowledge is used to justify and legitimize calls for adopting certain policies to resolve what is seen to be a problem that 'ought' to be resolved. The formulation is partly inspired by Rein and Schuss (1991. 265), who refer to problem-setting stories that 'link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action and facilitate the normative leap from "is" to 'ought"'. We depart from Rein and Schon's conception somewhat by emphasizing more strongly the factual claims (the characteristics of a phenomenon and normative principles (the morally' grounded principles used to legitimize the policy formulation invoked by actors as they define a problem and argue for a specific policy approach. The concept of policy stories seeks to capture how actors integrate knowledge claims into their politically charged arguments so as to 'frame' the issue under discussion. Because of the interlocking of the factual and normative dimension of policy making, a policy story, can be seen to create space for political agency. That is: a policy story serves by creating an argument grounded in a body of scientifically produced knowledge, to persuade and mobilize different groups as it represents a complete package: an authoritative problem-definition and a concomitant policy solution that is legitimized in both factual and normative terms. A policy story- that wins acceptance at the discursive level can be seen to define the terms of the debate for the establishment of policy and to de- legitimize competing conceptualizations and policy approaches. Through the political agency performed through a policy story it may come to dominate the policy field as it forms the central cognitive-normative organising device for specific formulation and establishment of policy within different organizations. In this way, the policy story' may over time attain a 'taken for granted' char- acter as it comes to structure, and reflect, policy practice. This process of stabilization is best described as a process of institutionalization. Following Scott, we can define institutionalization as a 'process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come so be normatively' and cognitively held in place, and practically taken for granted as lawful' Scott at al. 1994: 10). This latter feature is critical to the argument presented here. In the change from an argument for a specific policy approach to the establishment of that policy in practice, the policy story comes to define the cognitive-normative outlook of a policy regime. This can he defined as an interlock between the knowledge which underwrites the policy story, and the establishment in practice of the policy advocated in a policy story: That is: the knowledge that once formed part of an argument for a policy is now an integral part of the very rationality and identity' of the organization involved with managing this policy in practice. As such it becomes pact of the bundle of routines, rules, priorities and rationality of the organizations in the policy field see Douglas 1986; March and Olsen 1989: Scott and Meyer. 1994).

#### Reform is impossible in a world where casino capitalism continuously puts civic education and values under assault. The permutation takes away the last remaining vestiges of critical thought that enables debate and good decision-making. Instead, we need to overturn their entire mode of thinking.

Giroux 2012 (Henry Giroux, “Beyond the Politics of the Big Lie: The Educaton Deficit and the New Authoritarianism,” Truth Out, June 19, 2012. Accessed from: <http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism>)

The democratic deficit is not, as many commentators have argued, reducible to the growing (and unparalleled) inequality gap in the United States, the pervasiveness of lending fraud, favorable tax treatment for the wealthy, or the lack of adequate regulation of the financial sector. These are important issues, but they are more symptomatic than causal in relation to the democratic decline and rise of an uncivil culture in America. The democratic deficit is closely related, however, to an unprecedented deficit in critical education. The power of finance capital in recent years has not only targeted the realm of official politics, but also directed its attention toward a range of educational apparatuses - really, a vast and complex ideological ecosystem that reproduces itself through nuance, distraction, innuendo, myths, lies and misrepresentations. This media ecosystem not only changes our sense of time, space and information; it also redefines the very meaning of the social and this is far from a democratic process, especially as the architecture of the Internet and other media platforms are largely in the hands of private interests.[(13)](http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism#a13) The educational pipelines for corporate messages and ideology are everywhere and have for the last twenty-five years successfully drowned out any serious criticism and challenge to market fundamentalism.¶ The current corrupt and dysfunctional state of American politics is about a growing authoritarianism tied to economic, political and cultural formations that have hijacked democracy and put structural and ideological forces in place that constitute a new regime of politics, not simply a series of bad policies. The solution in this case does not lie in promoting piecemeal reforms, such as a greater redistribution of wealth and income, but in dismantling all the institutional, ideological and social formations that make gratuitous inequality and other antidemocratic forces possible at all. Even the concept of reform has been stripped of its democratic possibilities and has become a euphemism to "cover up the harsh realities of draconian cutbacks in wages, salaries, pensions and public welfare and the sharp increases in regressive taxes."[(14)](http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism#a14)¶ Instead of reversing progressive changes made by workers, women, young people, and others, the American public needs a new understanding of what it would mean to advance the ideological and material relations of a real democracy, while removing American society from the grip of "an authoritarian political culture."[(15)](http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/9865-beyond-the-politics-of-the-big-lie-the-education-deficit-and-the-new-authoritarianism#a15)This will require new conceptions of politics, social responsibility, power, civic courage, civil society and democracy itself. If we do not safeguard the remaining public spaces that provide individuals and social movements with new ways to think about and participate in politics, then authoritarianism will solidify its hold on the American public. In doing so, it will create a culture that criminalizes dissent, and those who suffer under antidemocratic ideologies and policies will be both blamed for the current economic crisis and punished by ruling elites.¶ What is crucial to grasp at the current historical moment is that the fate of democracy is inextricably linked to a profound crisis of contemporary knowledge, characterized by its increasing commodification, fragmentation, privatization and a turn toward racist and jingoistic conceits. As knowledge becomes abstracted from the rigors of civic culture and is reduced to questions of style, ritual and image, it undermines the political, ethical and governing conditions for individuals to construct those viable public spheres necessary for debate, collective action and solving urgent social problems. As public spheres are privatized, commodified and turned over to the crushing forces of turbo capitalism, the opportunities for openness, inclusiveness and dialogue that nurture the very idea and possibility of a discourse about democracy cease to exist.¶ The lesson to be learned in this instance is that political agency involves learning how to deliberate, make judgments and exercise choices, particularly as the latter are brought to bear on critical activities that offer the possibility of change. Civic education as it is experienced and produced throughout an ever-diminishing number of institutions provides individuals with opportunities to see themselves as capable of doing more than the existing configurations of power of any given society would wish to admit. And it is precisely this notion of civic agency and critical education that has been under aggressive assault within the new and harsh corporate order of casino capitalism.

#### The permutation follows the trajectory impearlist accommodation in form and content. This is a strategy to assimilate and usurp any radical potential from the alternative by way of rendering its positionality in relation to the centered circle of the aff. Alt solves the disad to the metaphysics of assimilation

Spanos 2000 (America’s Shadow: anatomy of empire pp. 57-58)

In other words, my invocation of Heidegger's meditation on the ge­nealogy of the Occidental concept of the true and the false suggests that the contemporary genealogies of imperialism, which have turned to his­tory against the prior hegemony of "theory" in order to undertake their critique, have not been historical enough. The disabling consequences of this failure are manifold, but the most serious has to do with the rela­tionship between the West as a state of mind that sees/grasps the truth of being and as a relay of imperial practices this state of mind compels. The preceding interrogation of the ontotheological tradition has shown that the metaphysical orientation it privileges at the outset involves the re-presentation of being. That is to say, it metaphorizes (i.e., reifies) the mutable be-ing of being. More specifically, it reduces being to the micro­cosmic figure of the centered circle supervised by the panoptic (solar) eye, a figure that becomes increasingly complex, especially in the period of the so-called Enlightenment, in its internal structure and its relation to the exterior Other (the periphery). This means that the Western con­sciousness at large comports itself before "reality," no matter what its site, in such a way that it transforms "it" into a region or territory or domain that it can survey at a glance. As such an optical technology, it perceives and orders — renders intelligible, brings "peace" to — every differential thing and every differential event it encounters according to the taxonomic imperatives of its measuring center. The West represents the end of this ocularcentric operation as the truth that brings the peace of fulfillment, of a completed development. But the destruction of the ontology of the ontotheological tradition discloses that this intelligibility and this peace of the Western dispensation — this Pax Metaphysica — are the consequences of a blindness to or a coercion or accommodation of any thing or event that is external to its circumference: is the result, that is, of its colonization of the "false."

#### Don’t trust their truth claims: Their nuclear war outweighs claims marginalizes all wars that aren’t nuclear. This is what sustains ongoing global violence.

Der Derian and Shapiro 89 [James, Michael, Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Professor of Political Science at University of Hawaii at Manoa, “International/Intertextual Relations”, pg. 21]

As a first step in this direction, it is important to note that the context for textualizing modernity’s subjects, objects, and thematic is a recognition that what is unusual about the present is the degree of distance between experience and knowledge such that one must increasingly depend on knowledge agents nominated within modernity’s knowledge-related discourses (the prevailing, authoritative representational practices through which experience is mediated and evaluated). Thus, what the scenario concerning the genealogy of beliefs provides, among other things, is an intimation of how representational practices relate to policy issues. More specifically, because we live in a world in which danger is institutionalized, persons interested in relating their fears to situations of danger have to become consumers of representations from institutions that have the legitimacy to produce interpretations of danger. However, when something is recognized as a representational *practice* rather than an authoritative description, it can be treated as contentious. It is simply the case that most traditional forms of political analysis help to naturalize reigning interpretations rather than registering their meaning- and value-constituting effects. In contrast with such unreflective modes is Paul Virilio’s analysis of the modern text within which problems of international danger are produced. According to Virilio, the modern text of international danger is scripted by logistical experts, for we are in what he calls “the age of logistics,” in which all seemingly nonmilitary social processes are “vectorized” in accordance with preparation for war. In this era, in which logistical thinking is highly technicalized, the “civilian” is given no status in the discourse within which defense against nuclear surprise attack (one of the primary interpretations of the danger) is presented. As Virilio puts it: “The civilian finds himself discriminated against in favor of a kind of crystallization of the scientific and military.” The preeminence of this mode of military intelligence amounts to a depoliticizing of international danger insofar as it deprivileges anything but a scientific/military standpoint as valid knowledge. Among the most prominent concepts that belong to this logistical mode of representing nuclear danger is that of deterrence. The age of deterrence, in which planning is skewed in the direction of reducing the threat of sudden nuclear annihilation, is characterized by the masking of other kinds of war or modes of violence between states that, ironically, deterrence thinking encourages. Deterrence thinking is thus what Virilio calls an “intelligence of war that eludes politics.” The mystifying of the state of war that now exists is the illusion that war itself is only full-scale nuclear combat. While logistical thinking preoccupies itself with the avoidance of such catastrophies, the armed hostilities that go on are represented not as war but as some form of “interstate delinquencies,” as “state terrorism.” The modern politics of preoccupation with extermination amounts, then, to a depoliticizaiton of all violent confrontations that stop short of nuclear combat. This pattern of representation allows, increasingly, what Virilio calls “acts of war without war:” the taking or rescue of hostages, retaliatory raids for ship movements interpreted as hostile or transgressive, and so on. The point is that these acts of violence, which elude the obloquy of being “acts of war,” operate within a mystified zone, within representations monopolized within logistical thinking and thus outside of a broader, politicizing impetus.

#### Their calculations are utility for utility’s sake. The affirmative can only see value in strategy, hegemony, and control.

Burke 07 [Anthony, Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and Int. Relations at the Univ. of New South Wales, Sydney, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, 210]

After the 11 September attacks, George W. Bush told Americans that even though 'this conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others' it 'will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing'. He told them that `the course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain'. Like a latter-day Francis Bacon, Bush voiced his conviction that the use of force against terror would provide America with 'fitting certainty' .1°3 Thus, while the US strategy in Iraq has been unravelling on its own terms, the enframing machinery of strategic reason grinds on in all its unreflective, calculating arrogance, endlessly demanding that power have no limits, that everything be made useful, that no ethical framework be permitted to slow its progress. The endlessness of it is what is most frightening, bound so deeply into the ontological bedrock of modern industrial civilisation as to appear like a second law of nature and a new meaning of being. Calculation, hegemony, utility: this, for strategic man, is meaning. Yet Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, had already sounded a warning – pointing to the emptiness of a utilitarianism that gets caught in an 'unending chain of means and ends' in which 'all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed into means for some further ends' .104 This perfectly describes the rolling disaster of the United States' policy towards Iraq, from the time the Reagan administration decided to make of Saddam a 'strategic asset', then sought his removal through a decade of failed and ever more destructive policy, until only the invasion and occupation of the country could seemingly achieve US goals. It perfectly describes the geopolitical panic and ambition of the Bush neoconservatives, who have sought to build one illusory strategic 'victory' on another (Afghanistan, Iraq, then . . .) without consideration of what counts as victory, its manifest failures and its unbearable human, economic and political costs. Strategy, seeking one proliferating end after another, becomes an end in itself and the ultimate, narcissistic source of meaning. To use Arendt's words, it 'defies questioning about its own use . . . utility established as meaning generates meaninglessness'.105 When will it stop? When will Oppenheimer's ethical plea – made only a year before John F. Kennedy warned that the 'fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth' – ever be heard and acted upon?106 Heidegger warned that within modern instrumental reason lay a double tragedy: that as man turned himself into a resource, into 'standing reserve', he would simultaneously 'exalt himself to the posture of lord of the earth'. This, he warned, 'in turn gives rise to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself.'107 Bacon did say that scientific man would recover 'his empire over creation' that was lost at the Fall, affirming his 'power over nature' with 'new creations and imitations of divine works' until 'man may be said to be a god unto man'.108 So what of Iraq, the land where, with the words of Isaiah, George W. Bush triumphantly informed the world on 1 May 2003 that 'the United States and its allies have prevailed'?109 Man the vengeful god: Iraq is this god's plaything, strategic man's burnt offering to himself, this ever useful death, ashes in the President's mouth.

1. Adams 2003 (Jason, The Evergreen State College, POPULAR DEFENSE IN THE EMPIRE OF SPEED: PAUL VIRILIO AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE POLITICAL BODY. THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS - In the Department Of Political Science - SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY - November 2003) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Hayes 2013 (Heather Ashley Hayes, Asst Prof of Rhetoric, Whitman College. “Violent Subjects: A Rhetorical Cartography of Bodies, Spaces, and Technologies in the Global War on Terror.” A Dissertation SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Heather Ashley Hayes IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Ronald Walter Greene, Adviser, April 2013) [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. McVicker 2012 (THE TASK OF JOURNALISM IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM IMAGINING THE PROFANE McVicker, Jeanette Philosophy Today; May 2012; 56, 2; ProQuest pg. 243) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Baudrillard 2010 (Jean Baudrillard, ‘Carinval and Cannibal’ 2010) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Baudrillard and Noailles 2008 (Jean Baudrillard and Enrique Valiente Noailles, Translated by Chris Turner, Exiles from Dialog, Polity Press, Pages 33-34) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)